Let’s get Provoked! Part 1: “The Unipolar Moment” through “Clinton’s Bosnian War”

Jacob Winograd, Shaun Collins & I discuss the first 85 pages (paperback) of Scott Horton’s “Provoked”.
Part 1: “The Unipolar Moment” through “Clinton’s Bosnian War”
Get the book here: https://www.amazon.com/Provoked-Washington-Started-Catastrophe-Ukraine/dp/1733647376/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1YXTNX0938HTX&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.JZ9mkJ5TPMxU1xohpzBN-zWHA_CQdJL9cEh1hKbHILFptB1VraW9pMZHVSW_lhbPAni2C-CVgmWG6XxoqHYkr0G5a0ym–8XWayY-Ak_LbYo2DOhgYLWsCv1_6E3np_O03sSMGncuOJlH15C8ijSXg.uYFutm_DGxP-N9VoNlq3ZWmjQwFc6EQAsEVnB7gg4rI&dib_tag=se&keywords=scott+horton+provoked&qid=1733850772&sprefix=scott+h%2Caps%2C345&sr=8-1

Transcript:

(0:05) All right, well, hello everybody. (0:13) Sorry we’re running late tonight. (0:15) I’m Jacob Winograd.(0:16) I am the host of the Biblical Anarchy podcast at the Libertarian Christian Institute, part (0:21) of our Christians for Liberty network. (0:24) I’m very excited to kick off this new series that, if you guys didn’t see it, made an announcement (0:30) about this last week. (0:31) But I’m here with a couple new buddies of mine.(0:34) And we were brought together by this giant monolith, Provoked, How Washington Started (0:41) the New Cold War with Russia and the Catastrophe in Ukraine by the one and only Scott Horton. (0:47) And this book, as you can see, and actually, I don’t think I have, I think it’s upstairs, (0:53) unfortunately. (0:54) I don’t have Scott’s old book to compare it with.(0:57) Oh, no, I do. (0:57) I have it right here. (0:59) And I’m knocking stuff over.(1:01) But yeah, we’ll do the, we’ll do the meme, right? (1:03) The, here’s enough already, and then, yeah, so a little thicker, a little bit, not as (1:14) much of a light read. (1:17) So but yeah, we got a lot. (1:19) So this book is, as you can see, monstrous.(1:23) And because of that, we were all talking on X, just to give a brief, you know, for those (1:27) who didn’t see the announcement, we collectively all came to the idea, and Scott liked the (1:33) idea, too, that, like, we should do a book club on this, get together and talk. (1:37) And so every Monday for the next, what, the eight weeks, maybe nine weeks, we might do (1:41) like a finale at the end, we’re going to be going through this book section by section, (1:46) roughly like 80 to 90 pages per section, and breaking it down, talking about different (1:51) things from the different administrations, the different revolutions, different events (1:58) and things that were going on in our country and in the world, Ukraine and Russia. (2:05) There’s so many things.(2:07) It’s wild. (2:08) And just even this section alone, honestly, what we’re talking about tonight, brothers, (2:12) we could do a whole series on just this section. (2:15) That is what is crazy about it.(2:18) I’m going to go ahead and let my two co-hosts here introduce themselves. (2:22) Sean’s hiding out in a bunker because he has so many things to say tonight, to just (2:28) absolutely eviscerate the authorities, to absolutely eviscerate the regime, that he can’t (2:34) even show his face, he can’t share his location, he is streaming from kind of, like, remote, (2:39) he’s hiding out like Bin Laden in some cave right now. (2:42) So that or the Feds are making his camera not work, one or the other, you take your (2:47) pick on what you think’s going on there.(2:48) But, Sean, you want to go ahead and introduce yourself, even though we can’t see your lovely (2:56) face. (2:57) Go ahead and just give yourself a little introduction here and your thoughts on this first section (3:02) just as a kind of, you know, opening remark. (3:05) Oh, my God.(3:06) So first off, I apologize that I am not on camera. (3:10) I have no idea why the camera won’t work. (3:13) We just tried troubleshooting for almost the last half hour, which is why we are late.(3:17) It is my fault. (3:18) I’ll eat this. (3:20) It is totally on me.(3:21) We can’t figure it out. (3:22) I have a brand new computer. (3:24) I have the best Internet money can buy.(3:27) And here we are. (3:29) You can’t see me, but I hope you can hear me. (3:32) And as far as the, you know, can you guys hear me? (3:36) Hello.Hello. Yes, yes. (3:38) Loud and clear.(3:40) At least we are in. (3:41) OK, perfect. (3:42) Perfect.Perfect. (3:43) The Feds can hide your face, but they cannot silence your voice, Sean. (3:47) I just hope they’re not kicking my door in.(3:50) You know, I’m sure my hundred pound pity David Bowie would eat them. (3:54) But, you know, it is what it is. (3:57) But anyhow, if you guys can hear me, great.(4:00) I am so sorry you can’t see me. (4:02) But, you know, it’s one of those things where foreign policy is extremely important (4:08) because, number one, I come from a generation. (4:11) I am in my mid 40s.(4:12) I am a Gen Xer at the very tail end of Gen X, but I am a Gen Xer. (4:18) And we were completely lied to on a very, very huge. (4:24) I don’t know what to even call it.(4:26) A huge something that happened on September 11th, 2001. (4:31) And it started from there. (4:32) And it was based off lies and deceit and power and thirst for more.(4:39) And now they’re trying to do the same thing verbatim with this nonsense going on (4:44) between Russia and Ukraine, trying to say that, hey, Russia’s the big bad guy (4:49) who just invaded this country for no reason whatsoever. (4:53) They just decided to, you know, you know, we’re just going to invade Ukraine (4:57) because, well, we’re the bigger, badder country. (5:00) Well, they don’t call this book provoked for no reason.(5:03) And we’re fixing to point that out for you guys. (5:06) I am Sean Collins, the guy with a lot to say. (5:08) I rock the number one Liberty podcast in Detroit, Bugs in Reality.(5:12) You can find me anywhere, literally anywhere on all major platforms. (5:16) And from that, let’s give it to Mark. (5:18) Introduce yourself, homie.(5:20) John, I wish we could afford the little shadow (5:23) outline of your your head so we could just see it. (5:26) And then we can change your voice. (5:28) We need to give you that monster voice.(5:29) All right, we’re going to get a little backlight going. (5:33) But welcome. Welcome, everybody.(5:35) Welcome to provoked. (5:36) I’m Mark Poles, and this book is amazing. (5:39) And it’s the first thing that I’ve really delved into to this level.(5:44) And I’m very excited to get started. (5:45) So let’s just do it, gentlemen. (5:49) Oh, all righty.(5:51) We got a lot to say. (5:52) My my my part’s so deep, so I’m going to keep my short at the beginning. (5:55) Yeah, yeah, I agree.(5:57) Before we get out, so I’ll get to I think I’m kicking us off, (6:01) although I’ll try to keep a conversation. (6:02) I just want I don’t want to rant for 15, 20 minutes. (6:05) So I’ll probably bring some stuff up and then we’ll kind of riff on it (6:08) for a little bit before we get into it.(6:12) I also wanted to just plug. (6:14) Let me go over here quick and do a share screen (6:21) to remind you guys that here at the end of the year, (6:24) LCI, we’re doing a little fundraiser because we have a generous (6:29) challenge grant of up to 15 K. (6:31) So every dollar you give to Libertarian Christian Institute, (6:34) that dollar is matched. (6:35) And that helps us to provide content like what we’re producing tonight (6:39) with my two co-hosts.(6:40) And so if you are feeling generous and you want to, you know, (6:44) do some tax deductible donations this year, (6:47) go to LibertarianChristians.com slash donate, and that can be doubled. (6:51) And also I’m going to click here. (6:53) As you can see, we this book club is kind of like a two (6:58) two four, right? (6:59) So we got the streams are doing every Monday.(7:02) And if you want, you can also join a LCI book club (7:05) that’ll be going through the same exact sections (7:07) that we’re talking about each week. (7:10) So that’ll be on Thursday night. (7:11) And we still have opening.(7:12) We have a max of 15 slots. (7:14) I think about half of them are taken so far. (7:17) But yes, you’ll be able to not only hear our live streams, (7:20) but if you want to, you can join this (7:21) and then we can talk about it on Thursday nights as well.(7:25) As you can see right here, week one, we’re going to be getting into now. (7:29) We were reading from the very beginning, which was the unipolar moment up. (7:33) That was like when we pretty much went through the entirety of George Bush Senior (7:37) and then into the beginning of the Clinton administration (7:40) and Clinton’s Bosnian War.(7:42) So we have a lot to talk about tonight. (7:45) Like I said at the beginning, we could make this almost an entire series (7:49) of just just this section (7:53) because there’s a lot of history here. (7:55) I mean, even just the history of of the Bosnian War (7:59) and Yugoslavia and all that, there’s so much that we could go into there.(8:03) But we’ll start at the beginning (8:07) with the end of the Cold War. (8:10) And I was born in 92. (8:14) So I think you kind of alluded to this, Mark.(8:15) We have like three different, you know, actually, Sean, you were the broad. (8:19) You brought your Gen X. (8:21) Mark, are you Gen X or what generation are you? (8:23) Yeah, so I did bring that up is I’m 50. (8:26) Sean’s is mid 40s and you were born in 92.(8:28) So we’ve got you know, I’m I’m mid, you know, entrenched Gen X. (8:32) I would have enlisted in 97 for the military, which would have been right (8:36) before, you know, obviously 2001. (8:38) So it would have been before Iraq and and all that. (8:41) But after Kuwait, of course.(8:43) So so that would have been me. (8:45) And then you guys are you’re the youngest, obviously. (8:47) And then and then Sean’s kind of just a few years behind me.(8:52) Yeah, so for me, this is all like it’s interesting because like I I grew up (8:57) in the the decade after the Cold War had basically ended (9:02) and just believed that we lived in this magical moment of peace (9:05) and that America prevailed and America was, you know, (9:08) we’re the one free nation in the world and all that. (9:11) So going back and reading some of the history of the end of the Cold War was (9:18) interesting. (9:18) I guess we can kick it off.(9:20) You know, the the end of the Cold War was sort of brought off (9:24) by the last leader of the Soviet Union, which was Gorbachev. (9:29) And he sought to transform the Soviet system. (9:32) And he had these like these groundbreaking reforms, which I’m going to like (9:36) butcher the Russian pronunciation here, but it’s Kolosnok and Perestroika (9:44) that was openness and restructuring.(9:47) And he was trying to modernize the USSR. (9:49) He was trying to reduce Cold War tensions. (9:52) And he was interested, as we’ll get into, in getting along with the West (9:57) and integrating more with (9:59) the rest of the European continent, you know, with the with the Western side (10:04) of Europe.And so there was this shift, there was more dialogue. (10:09) There was economic restructuring, (10:13) allowing for more market, you know, like, you know, again, (10:15) limited market oriented reforms to try to increase productivity and innovation. (10:21) They were allowing for an investment for the first time (10:25) through joint ventures between the Soviet enterprises (10:28) and international companies.(10:30) And yeah, so they were, you know, still having some resistance (10:34) from hardliners in the Communist Party. (10:36) And they they didn’t go out quietly exactly either. (10:41) And despite these reforms, they were still undergoing (10:44) a lot of inflation, worker shortages, a lot of unemployment (10:50) as they, you know, they were trying to transition from a centrally planned system (10:54) and at least something that was a hybrid, right? (10:58) Not a perfect free market, but they’re at least trying to do some stuff.(11:02) And they were trying to combat corruption and secrecy by promoting (11:07) transparency in their government. (11:09) They were repealing things that had been taboo before, (11:12) like you were allowed to talk about Stalin and his purges and his censorship (11:17) that was actually allowed to be talked about in the media (11:19) where that had been completely suppressed before. (11:23) There were social reforms and a lot of that.(11:26) And yeah, the just that there were other like non-communist (11:30) political groups that were allowed to be part of this kind of like, (11:34) you know, burgeoning democracy. (11:36) So I don’t know, like setting the stage of like what’s going on in Russia, (11:40) I think is important, like it’s you don’t want to oversell it. (11:44) Like it wasn’t like suddenly, you know, it wasn’t (11:49) without its problems.(11:51) But Gorbachev, I think from my reading and we’ll get into some more examples (11:55) of this, but I kind of feel like he was genuine in trying to seek reform (12:01) and bring Russia into like open relationship. (12:06) Like I think he saw what was going on in the West. (12:07) It was like, you know what? (12:08) Like, I would rather Russia be part of that than keep doing what we’re doing.(12:12) That’s kind of the sense I get reading about what he was doing there (12:16) and kind of like setting the stage here. (12:17) What you guys have any things you want to comment on top of that? (12:22) Yeah, John. Yeah.(12:24) You know, the fact that, you know, Mikhail Gorbachev was actually a reformist. (12:29) He wasn’t a communist. (12:30) He wasn’t a socialist.(12:31) He wasn’t any you know, anything that was typically bad. (12:35) He really wanted to bring a new Russia, a new USSR at the time. (12:40) And and I don’t know if he was necessarily for peace or against it, (12:45) but the fact that he was willing to play with the West a little bit (12:49) and especially with Western Europe, you know, that was a big deal for that time.(12:55) And and the and the fact that, you know, George H.W. (12:59) Bush was kind of, you know, on board with it, you know, in the beginning, (13:03) especially like he thought this was a good deal or whatever. (13:07) Unfortunately, you know, the neocons that surrounded him, (13:10) you know, kind of kind of put an ax on that. (13:13) And I’m sure you’ll dig into that when you when you go forward.(13:16) But I mean, that’s kind of just what I have to say in the beginning of all that. (13:20) Yeah, yeah, yeah. (13:22) So if I may.(13:24) So, Sean, you might remember, but there was and you wouldn’t remember. (13:28) Probably you weren’t alive, Jacob. (13:29) But there was a video of Gorbachev going through a supermarket.(13:33) I think it was in Texas. (13:35) There’s a video of him and looking through the supermarket (13:38) and the supermarket is overflowing with food. (13:41) Like the produce is, you know, over the baskets and everything, (13:44) and he like was moved, he was like brought to tears that America had such prosperity.(13:50) And let’s be honest, they had Afghanistan, Afghanistan before we did. (13:55) So they had the 1980s and we credit us with bankrupting them. (13:59) But look at how much that’s costing us in the Middle East.(14:01) And they might have had a pretty good hand in helping with that and that as well. (14:06) So the collapse of the of the of the wall for me was very special (14:10) because my mom escaped East Germany in 1953. (14:13) So I have a very close tie with Germany, communism, (14:16) how Germany and Russia hate each other.(14:18) I mean, that just the animosity and everything. (14:20) So please continue with your story. (14:22) But that I just remember those two things.(14:23) Gorbachev like actually moved to tears at the prosperity of America. (14:27) And I think that’s when he realizes we need to stop doing what we’re doing (14:31) because it’s not working. (14:33) Right.Yeah. (14:34) I mean, and there’s like as much as we as, (14:36) you know, anti interventionist libertarian anarchists, (14:40) you know, we’re typically going to think the worst of any government leader. (14:45) Right.And of any of any nation state. (14:47) And we typically don’t want America to have a role on the global stage. (14:52) But, you know, like there was a hypothetical opportunity here (14:57) for our the United States government leaders (15:00) to actually capitalize on what Gorbachev was trying to do.(15:04) And the world could look very different today. (15:07) Right. Like we’d still have nation states.(15:09) We’d still have taxation. (15:10) We’d still have the problems that come with like Western modern democracies. (15:15) Right.But (15:18) you could have at least like, I don’t know, (15:20) you wouldn’t have the U.S. (15:22) Empire, perhaps, and you might have at least a significant amount, (15:25) you know, higher amount of human flourishing around the world (15:28) than than we currently have. (15:29) So, I mean, you can it’s hard to it’s hard to play out the counterfactuals. (15:33) Right.But one can just imagine a different path (15:37) that our government could have gone down. (15:40) I mean, you know, I was I looked into again, (15:42) this is stuff that’s a little bit new to me. (15:44) I haven’t studied much about the Cold War stuff.(15:48) You know, I didn’t realize he was even in favor of (15:52) dissolving the Warsaw Pact, (15:54) which is like a huge concession to come to the table with. Right. (15:57) And so that was Poland, Hungary, (16:03) Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania.(16:07) There’s a peace treaty. (16:08) Yeah. Yeah, it was.(16:11) And so it was a counterweight to the NATO alliance, really, (16:15) in that in its own way, because it was that West, you know, whatever, (16:19) whatever it stood for, I remember. (16:20) But it was one of those (16:22) counterbalances that came out of the Cold War, really the merge out of that. (16:26) Yeah.Yeah. He had pushed arms reductions treaties, (16:29) including the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces, the INF. (16:31) That’s the INF treaty in 1987, which eliminated an entire category (16:35) of nuclear weapons.So there’s a lot there. (16:40) But despite all of this, like outreach to the West, (16:44) the proposals in Washington were were met with skepticism. (16:48) Scott goes into his book, how when (16:51) well, I don’t know how to pronounce his guy’s name, but Wyrick, (16:54) when he was like talking to Bush about this stuff, (16:57) Condoleezza Rice just came in.(16:59) And anyone who’s a longtime, you know, anti-war interventionist (17:04) knows that name. Right. (17:06) And so she comes in and surprise, surprise, (17:10) dismisses this idea of, you know, (17:13) collaboration between Russia and the Western powers.(17:16) And instead, we’re going to get into a pattern of exploitation. (17:21) I like this quote from the book. (17:23) I have it here in my notes.(17:25) The debate was not over whether the U.S. (17:28) would remain in Europe, (17:29) but rather the degree of cooperation with the new post-Soviet Russia. (17:34) Any form of a unified northern military alliance or partnership with Moscow (17:39) would have brought its own dangers. (17:40) But that possibility was not taken much more seriously (17:43) than the idea of just coming home.(17:45) Worse, successive U.S. (17:48) administrations, beginning with H.W. (17:50) Bush, showed an avowed lack of concern over how Russians viewed (17:54) the expansion of the Western alliance into spheres (17:59) where theirs used to be while leaving them on the outside (18:02) and possibly still the object of its intentions. (18:06) And I thought that was interesting because like there’s some like (18:09) I was reading some of the primary sources that Scott cites, (18:12) and some of them were like trying to give like, listen, (18:14) maybe this was a mistake, but like maybe you can try to justify (18:18) some skepticism from, you know, Western governments to be like, (18:22) I don’t know if you really trust them, but like, OK, but like (18:25) that’s both ways, right? (18:26) Like Gorbachev is taking a risk by saying, I want to trust you. (18:29) And it’s like, but we don’t know.(18:32) Like he’s like, I want to trust you, but also like I’m a little concerned, (18:35) like we don’t want to just like completely roll over and suddenly like, (18:39) you know, you expand your military alliance. (18:41) And now it’s like like you don’t want to be dominated by us (18:45) and we don’t want to be dominated by you. (18:47) No one wants to be ruled or dominated by a foreign empire (18:50) or for or foreign military alliance.(18:54) So I thought that was an interesting way to kind of (18:58) set the stage here. (18:59) And then Scott goes into these opening arguments, (19:02) which I think are really important, about were there promises (19:06) to not expand NATO? (19:08) Because that that is a lot of what you hear in the media, right? (19:11) Is that there were no promises. (19:14) There was no formally signed agreement or treaty.(19:17) But the first point he goes into is debunking that by going into (19:22) and citing actual political science experts on why it’s actually very common (19:28) between nations, between governments for there to be informal agreements (19:33) used as, you know, common tools of negotiation (19:38) and people taking each other at their word. (19:41) You know, throughout the Cold War, there were various handshake agreements. (19:46) One example he cites is John F. (19:48) Kennedy’s promise to remove the Jupiter missiles from Turkey and Italy (19:51) in exchange for the USSR withdrawing its missiles from Cuba (19:55) during the 1962 missile crisis.(20:00) And that deal was secret, right? (20:02) It wasn’t even officially documented, but both sides honored it (20:07) and it diffused one of the Cold War’s tensest moments. (20:10) And so like right out the gate, which, you know, and I don’t know, (20:15) like it just seems to me actually kind of intuitive, right? (20:17) Like, yeah, there are treaties and stuff, but it’s not like every decision (20:21) and every agreement the governments make with each other is like (20:24) they get together and sign a 100 page document to make it so. (20:28) Especially when you’re like, you know, like if you’re in war and you’re like (20:32) or even a Cold War, if you’re like have hostile relations and whatnot, (20:36) you know, like it’s one thing.(20:38) There’s a term like normalized relations. (20:40) It’s like when you don’t have normalized relations with a nation, (20:43) how are you supposed to have normalized procedures with them, right? (20:47) It just doesn’t make any sense. (20:49) Have you guys want to riff on anything I’ve said? (20:53) You know, I want to add into a little bit of that, because, you know, (20:57) they made a lot of handshake deals during World War Two, too, as well.(21:02) Like they, you know, this was not an uncommon theme, especially, (21:06) you know, way back when, you know, these things just kind of happened. (21:10) And so, yeah, those those handshake deals should be taken at face value (21:15) at their word because they had been happening for decades before that. (21:19) Just like you you had mentioned with the Cuban Missile Crisis.(21:23) Like the Cuban Missile Crisis is crazy because, you know, and I believe (21:27) it was Dave Smith who pointed it out, you know, that (21:30) the Cuban Missile Crisis was the United States like hard stop. (21:34) Like if you’re going to do this, we’re going to do something to you, (21:38) which is kind of where Russia is at with Ukraine right now. (21:41) If you’re going to do this with Ukraine, we’re going to do the thing.(21:45) And that, you know, that’s where we’re at in this this (21:48) this this conflict at the moment. (21:50) But the fact is that these handshake deals have been have been made (21:54) since World War Two. (21:55) And there’s nothing new under the sun.(21:57) And now all of a sudden, like the the neocons and naysayers (22:00) want to just kind of throw it under the bus and say, well, hey, you know, (22:04) it was never put on paper or it was, you know, this was a deal (22:08) that was made between the West and not NATO or vice versa. (22:12) They play, you know, it’s always moving the goalposts. (22:15) That’s one thing about this book is it’s always moving the goalposts (22:19) when Russia was really genuinely trying to play.(22:23) In the game. (22:28) Yeah, I think I think Russia was very much involved and very interested (22:31) in changing and and just getting away from what wasn’t working. (22:35) They realized it was broken.(22:37) The system had failed. (22:38) They were broke. (22:38) They were bankrupt.It was over. (22:41) The experiment of communism had clearly failed in there (22:44) the way they had done it. (22:45) And it was time for a change.(22:46) And they were so open to the change. (22:49) I remember how initially open armed and we used the Treaty of Versailles (22:55) as an example of what really drove World War Two was how poorly (22:59) and how embarrassingly we treated Germany coming out of World War One (23:04) and how embarrassed and how absolutely we just humiliated them (23:08) in every possible way and just stood on their throat. (23:12) And that’s not what Bush one did.(23:13) He was used to the communism of Russia. (23:16) Like, I think he wanted the Soviet kind of the way it was (23:18) because he was a CIA guy back in the day. (23:20) So he knows how he knows how to handle a very stable nation (23:24) that is a bipolar power.Right. (23:27) And this was something very new that no one knew. (23:30) And this is what we do.(23:31) We go, oh, guys, we’ll figure it out later. (23:33) Maybe maybe we should get in writing beforehand. (23:35) I mean, I don’t disagree with the handshake deals, but like we always go, (23:39) OK, let’s put let’s put the you know, the Israel state here.(23:43) We’ll figure out the other stuff after. (23:45) Well, it’s been 60 years and we haven’t figured it all out. (23:49) Well, it’s just there’s a pattern, though, where we expect them to uphold (23:54) and anyone we deal with, we expect the people we deal with to stick to their word, (23:59) but we don’t ever have to stick to.(24:01) And by our I mean, our government, obviously, I don’t (24:03) it’s hard to get out of the habit, nasty habit of equivocating us (24:09) with our government, even though that is not the case. (24:12) But yeah, there’s tons. (24:14) You brought up World War Two examples, Sean.(24:16) Yeah, I mean, there’s one in the book, I think, about the Berlin Wall, (24:18) how that was a World War Two agreement and that stood till the end of the Cold War. (24:23) So, I mean, plenty of examples of that we could go through. (24:27) But then it’s not even just like there was a one off.(24:32) Oh, yeah, we won’t expand NATO. (24:34) And that was it. (24:35) There was multiple instances of Western and U.S. (24:39) governing officials, people who are part of the the.(24:43) The government, (24:45) like the ruling governments at the time who made assurances that (24:50) these assurances are what made the deal to reunify Germany possible. (24:54) And Scott, like Scott explains this to the point of like (24:59) beating you over the head with it. (25:01) Just how many examples there are.(25:02) And I tried to like number them out as many as I could. (25:06) The first was James Baker, who was secretary of state. (25:11) He made assurances to Gorbachev and (25:15) Shev, I can’t pronounce this guy’s name.(25:18) Shevnardas, I think, is his name or something like that. (25:22) Yeah, the names are going to be fun for this for this book, (25:24) but it’s going to be great. (25:25) I don’t even try.I don’t try to do it. (25:27) I’m not trying because I’m going to do it. (25:29) I tried so many times to do the YouTube clips, like listen to their name, (25:33) just to like try to memorize it.(25:34) But I was like, I’m not going to remember by the time we’re saying. (25:37) It’s like a little. (25:38) Yes.(25:43) Shevnardas, there’s just too many D’s in that. (25:45) There are too many consonants in that to pronounce. (25:47) I’m sorry.(25:48) But this was February 1990, and he had a meeting with Gorbachev (25:53) and he assured that NATO’s jurisdiction would not move, (25:58) quote, one inch eastward. (25:59) And he emphasized ironclad guarantees to alleviate Soviet concerns (26:03) about German reunification within NATO. (26:06) Then Baker later repeated this assurance to the foreign minister.(26:10) That’s Edward Shev, we call him Shev, right? (26:13) OK, to Edward Shev, (26:15) stating that NATO forces would not expand into Eastern Europe. (26:19) Then Helmut Kohl, this was the West German chancellor, (26:24) told Gorbachev, this was February 10th, so just a day later, (26:27) that NATO could not expand its territory (26:30) into the current territory of East Germany, (26:32) that NATO’s activity would remain limited. (26:36) And then Hans-Dietrich Genscher, (26:39) and this is the West German foreign minister, (26:43) said NATO will not extend itself to the east.(26:46) This applied to Eastern Europe in general. (26:49) Given the impression that NATO’s expansion into Poland, Hungary (26:51) and other Warsaw Pact countries was off the table, (26:56) Manfred Warner, that is, (26:58) Secretary General Manfred Warner of NATO, (27:01) emphasized that NATO had no intention of deploying forces (27:03) beyond Germany’s borders. (27:05) He said NATO would focus on building a new European security structure (27:08) that included the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations, (27:12) assuring Moscow had nothing to fear from a military alliance.(27:15) And then British Prime Minister John Major (27:17) told Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Dmitry Yazov (27:22) that when he was concerned about there being plans (27:26) to strengthen NATO in Europe, (27:29) said that nothing of the sort will happen. (27:32) In 1991, so this is a little bit later in the process, (27:36) Gorbachev raised concerns because he was hearing discussions (27:38) about strengthening NATO again. (27:40) And then Prime Minister John assured him, (27:43) John Major of Britain, said that he assured, (27:48) it was actually a bunch of them there.(27:50) There was the defense minister, Yazov was there, Gorbachev was there. (27:53) But he said nothing of the sort will happen. (27:55) This is just like part of the process of (28:01) like installing new sort of like common European security architecture.(28:07) And we’re making NATO more of a political thing, not a military thing. (28:11) And we’re not going to do anything (28:13) with prejudice to Soviet interests and dignity. (28:17) That’s an exact quote from him, April 1991.(28:22) So that’s that’s at least seven right there from the book. (28:25) And I probably because some of them were like the same people (28:29) making the same promises to different other people. (28:31) There’s instances where like I didn’t have time to do.(28:34) And but like there’s like Baker made a lot of handwritten notes (28:38) on the Secretary of State documentation he handed in, (28:42) which we don’t have access to see. (28:43) We’d have to actually go and like the physical location (28:46) to see those handwritten notes. (28:48) But I forget the name of the woman who wrote the book, like not one inch.(28:52) She documents in her book a lot of the these instances. (28:57) And so the whole point here was that Gorbachev was like, (29:01) because all right, we want Germany to reunify. (29:04) But I’m kind of worried what’s going to happen after that, (29:06) because is NATO just going to expand its military right up to our border? (29:12) And they kind of did this like bargaining thing.(29:14) They were like, well, what would you rather have? (29:16) Would you rather have Germany be part of NATO? (29:18) Would you rather have Germany be independent and they could be nuclear? (29:22) And they’re like, well, we’d rather be Germany to be part of NATO then. (29:26) But then we don’t want NATO to expand. (29:29) Into the into the eastern part of Germany, (29:32) which, by the way, I don’t think Germany’s nuclear, just FYI, (29:35) they only have nuclear because of NATO.(29:37) I looked up the countries that are nuclear. (29:38) I don’t think Germany’s on the list. (29:41) Yeah, and I think they use that as a threat to get them to like back off (29:45) just just to declare.(29:48) Well, and so they did this bait and switch, which I’ll get to in a minute. (29:51) But like basically Gorbachev was like, fine, (29:54) if you don’t put NATO on the eastern side of Germany, (29:57) we will allow Germany to reunify. (29:59) And that was just a spoken word from Gorbachev.(30:02) But the West, ironically, was like, oh, well, Gorbachev said that he’s down with (30:07) because he said, quote, the German people’s right. (30:10) It’s the German people’s right to decide on reunification. (30:14) So his word was binding.(30:15) Like, oh, he already agreed. (30:17) He said that German reunification can just be a thing now. (30:20) So they went went on with that.(30:22) But Gorbachev only said that in the context of all the verbal reassurances (30:26) he got from the other side. (30:27) So it’s like so again, it’s like when you actually read what happened, (30:31) it’s like, what is it? (30:32) Do the verbal assurances matter or do they not matter? (30:35) Seems like they kind of matter. (30:37) It all depended on who you asked, though.(30:40) It always depended on who you asked, (30:43) which is insane to me, because, you know, when deals are made, they’re deals. (30:48) You make you make a handshake. (30:49) That’s what that’s what it is.(30:50) You’re a man of your word. (30:51) I mean, you know, Mark and I come from a time and I would hope you do, too. (30:55) You know, but, you know, a man of his word is a man of his word.(30:59) And when you shake somebody’s hand and you look them in the eyes, you meant it. (31:02) That that meant something. (31:04) Believe it or not, a handshake and a look in the eye (31:06) meant something at some point in this world.(31:09) It truly did. (31:10) And it happened many times within our governments. (31:13) It happened many times within superpowers and making deals (31:17) and businesses and stuff like that.(31:20) And so the fact is that once again, they were moving the goalposts by saying like, (31:25) hey, you know, well, maybe the NATO made the deal (31:29) or maybe it was just the West who made the deal. (31:32) It was always somebody else who made the deal in order for them to move the goalposts. (31:37) You know, like, for instance, when the Berlin Wall came down, (31:41) you know, it was supposed to be not another inch to the east, (31:45) you know, and in the beginning it was, you know, OK, the Berlin Wall comes down.(31:50) NATO is not going to come to the east. (31:53) But. Well, we all know what happened, you know what I mean? (31:58) I don’t want to spoil your stuff or anything like that, but.(32:00) Well, and like and like right and like right away, there was a bait and switch (32:03) because then like when Baker went back with this, like, oh, well, like, yeah, (32:08) German reunification, but NATO can’t go to the east. (32:10) They were like, well, how can it be one country and part of NATO, (32:14) but NATO can’t go to one side of the country? (32:15) That doesn’t make any sense. (32:17) And so then they had to like already kind of like, all right, fine.(32:19) Well, we’ll put them in there, but we’re not going to. (32:22) It’ll be like a partial NATO (32:25) presence in the east, but like we’ll have restrictions (32:28) on what kind of things can be there. (32:31) But like there was this (32:34) there was like this there was like a dual strategy going on.(32:38) And I so what did I I’m trying to find this quote. (32:41) So I got this excerpt from Joshua. (32:45) It’s Kuwait’s Shifrinson.(32:48) This is one of. (32:49) So this is yeah, the names here, man. (32:52) This was from this was from (32:55) this is one of the Scott’s footnotes.(32:58) This is footnote one twenty five deal or no deal. (33:01) The end of the Cold War and the US offer to limit NATO expansion. (33:08) And I think this is the right quote, right? (33:10) Yeah.So I’m going to read through this very quickly and end on this section. (33:15) This is just a really good breakdown, I think. (33:17) The false promise of accommodation, the United States (33:22) effort to maximize its influence.(33:28) The Bush, yeah, the Bush administration’s general strategy (33:31) for what it thought the United States should do in response (33:34) to the collapse of the Soviet power. (33:36) It did not reflect a fully articulated plan of action, though. (33:40) See, I didn’t it.(33:42) They had a general strategy, but not articulated plan. (33:45) It’s put simply, the US policymakers intended that the results (33:49) of German reunification would give the United States a free hand (33:53) by consolidating a reunified Germany, the great prize of the Cold War, (33:58) Europe within NATO and blocking any deal that would foreclose (34:02) American options in Europe’s new strategic landscape. (34:05) As Bush observed when meeting West German leadership at Camp David (34:09) on February 24th through 25th, 1990, he said, quote, (34:13) The Soviets are not in a position to dictate Germany’s relationship with NATO.(34:18) What worries me is talk that Germany must not stay in NATO. (34:22) To hell with that. We prevailed and they didn’t.(34:25) We can’t let the Soviets clutch victory from the jaws of defeat. (34:28) Contrary to what US officials told their Soviet interlocutors, (34:32) the Bush administration privately looked to use the collapse (34:35) of the Soviet power in Central and Eastern Europe (34:39) to enhance the US preeminence on the continent. (34:42) Even before meeting the West German leadership at Camp David in February, (34:46) Baker was ebullient over the prospect of reunifying Germany within NATO, (34:51) noting on the margins of his briefing paper that relative to the concessions (34:55) of the United States and West Germany (34:59) that they would have to offer, he said, quote, (35:01) You haven’t seen a leveraged buyout until you’ve seen this one, unquote.(35:06) The key to this end, as the paper elaborated, was structuring (35:09) the diplomatic process to create the appearance of US (35:14) attentiveness to Soviet interests, but actually avoiding a Soviet veto (35:18) and giving Gorbachev (35:21) a little real control over the terms of German reunification. (35:25) But the objective was to ensure Soviet acquiescence (35:28) to a reunified Germany within NATO and thus ensure and maintain (35:33) US involvement in Europe through the alliance. (35:36) And so basically, like right here, it’s just kind of like (35:38) there, and he goes on to continue quoting like Scott does, (35:43) and Scott quotes some of the same things.(35:44) But the whole here, it’s just it’s duplicitous. (35:47) It’s that we’re going to tell them one thing to get them to cooperate. (35:51) But our goals are actually like we don’t actually care about their concerns.(35:56) They lost. We won. (35:57) It’s time for the unipolar moment.(36:00) It’s time for American preeminence and German reunification (36:04) with step one to that plan to expand NATO. (36:06) And, you know, that that thing ends by saying that, like, (36:10) they had a private conversation to be like in, you know, within within. (36:15) So Congress voted initially against lawmakers, voted against expanding NATO.(36:20) But all the top guys like James Baker, Dick Cheney was also there. (36:25) He was the secretary of defense. (36:27) They were all just like, well, we’re not doing it now, (36:31) but it’s not off the table.(36:33) So we told them one thing. (36:36) But privately, yeah, we all know that, you know, if these countries (36:40) want us to go there, then, you know, we’re going to do that. Right.(36:44) So anyway, there is so much more I could do on just this opening stuff. (36:48) I want to like then do five minutes on the opening of Bosnia. (36:52) But was there anything on that you guys wanted to comment on? (36:54) Just the the the the extent of American deception? (37:00) Well, I personally think that where where America excelled (37:04) is that they got somehow Russia got Yeltsin.(37:08) And I think he just liked to drink. (37:11) And I think it wasn’t Gorbachev and it wasn’t after Gorbachev, (37:14) but it was Yeltsin’s time where they found this weird way (37:19) that he was trying to hold on to popularity. (37:22) But then they he was a drunk and he never seemed he just was all words (37:27) and placations.So like the like America would tell him something (37:31) and he’d run back to the Russians like it was like gospel (37:34) to try to quell their fears or whatever. (37:37) But I don’t think he knew what he was getting himself into, to be honest. (37:42) Oh, Boris.(37:45) Oh, Boris. Oh, Boris. (37:47) Well, Boris and Natasha, Lisa Squirrel, Musa Squirrel.(37:52) I actually have a story about Boris when I get to my section (37:56) about what you just said. (37:58) So, you know, it all ties in, I swear. (38:02) All right.Well, now I have five minutes to explain the entire Bosnian war. (38:07) Good luck. So (38:10) I think actually that.(38:13) So I went back to help me with this section. (38:15) Listen to an episode of Scott Horton’s show with and I forget (38:20) what was this guy’s name? (38:24) Do I have it up here still? (38:26) Is it Kit Clarenberger? Yes. (38:28) Kit, Kit Clarenberg.(38:30) And they went to my friend. (38:31) I told you they actually went back into the history before even what (38:35) Scott gets to in the book, (38:37) which just helped me to recontextualize everything. (38:39) But basically it was like the breakup of Yugoslavia, (38:43) which Bosnia was like right in the middle of was kind of like the testing ground (38:47) for the new American empire, the testing ground of all the American (38:52) interventions that came after Kosovo and Afghanistan and Iraq and Syria.(38:58) All of them. This was like the testing ground. (39:00) And they kind of did.(39:02) Like a bunch of different things, and it didn’t make any sense. (39:06) And like, I think the most important theme I saw, because we don’t have time (39:10) to like go step by step through this, but I think the most important thing here (39:13) was that you saw the precedent of America (39:18) deciding here’s where the lines are. (39:22) Right.Because they were they were OK with Yugoslavia breaking up like it. (39:25) They were like, oh, yeah, self-determination, like, you know, democracy. (39:29) Oh, but but only according to what we say, like here’s where the borders are.(39:33) Bosnia declares independence. (39:34) They’re OK. (39:36) Doesn’t matter about these other ethnic minority groups (39:39) who feel like they’re not being represented right.(39:42) You know, they have to stay where they are. (39:45) That, of course, has no bearing on the current conflict (39:47) between Russia and Ukraine, right? (39:51) No, no, no bearing at all. (39:52) None, none whatsoever.(39:54) Or Syria that we’re going to probably get into during our portion, right? (39:57) Like, come on, I’m going to help you out with Bosnia at the end. (40:00) Don’t worry. That’s like a lot of my section, too.(40:02) Yeah. But yeah, I think that’s a big (40:05) a big part of that of that section there was just that, you know, (40:10) America was testing out, you know, sort of like what they wanted to enact (40:13) in the rest of Europe and the Middle East in Yugoslavia (40:17) after the breakup. (40:20) What’s funny is that when you look at the history of that region beforehand, (40:23) it was actually like these different groups got along pretty well, actually, (40:28) despite what people have, despite what some people might think.(40:36) And yeah, I mean, I don’t even know how to (40:39) get into there is so much here to get into if I was going to go into more detail. (40:45) I guess it’s good to sprinkle in when we start talking later, too, (40:48) because I mean, I mean, it’s all it’s all interconnected. (40:51) It really is.So, yeah, I was going to say, maybe maybe we’ll go to the next speaker (40:54) and some of the things I have here, because I have like a whole page of notes (40:57) for this section, too. But (41:01) I think. Yeah.(41:03) So who who’s who’s next? (41:04) Is that you, Mark, or is that Sean? I forget. (41:06) That would be me, actually. (41:07) But I will add something to the Bosnia thing.(41:10) And once again, friends, I am very sorry about my camera. (41:14) I really don’t know what’s going on with it. (41:16) It’s just not working.(41:17) And we tried and tried and tried for a half hour, but we had to get the business. (41:21) So here we are. (41:22) You get no face, but a voice, which I have a voice for radio, (41:25) our face for radio anyways.(41:27) So it’s better for you guys. (41:29) I’m just going to say. (41:30) But, you know, when it comes to Bosnia, you know, actually.(41:33) So the whole Yugoslavia thing, all of that. (41:36) I have a good personal friend that I went to high school with (41:39) who actually is from Yugoslavia (41:41) and was there during all of that and has pictures of himself (41:46) as a little boy carrying around an AK-47, you know, (41:50) to defend the Denet at a certain point. (41:52) But, you know, the fact is, is that what is easy? (41:56) And Jeff says, if you need someone with a camera next time, let me know.(41:59) Dude, I have a camera. (42:01) It’s just being stupid. (42:03) I’m so sorry.(42:04) But anyhow, you know, the thing about Bosnia was it was (42:08) it was too many chiefs and not enough Indians is what it was. (42:12) There was multiple different religions. (42:15) There was multiple different regimes.(42:17) And it just kind of happened. (42:19) It was just one of those things where they were bound to split. (42:22) They were bound to have a fight.(42:24) And that was that. (42:25) And the fact that NATO came in was one of the biggest no-nos (42:30) they could have done because that was a breach (42:33) of the deal that they made with the Russians. (42:36) You know, but I digress.(42:38) I, you know, I don’t want to delve too much into that, you know, (42:40) but that being said, you know, in, you know, you know, exit H.W. (42:46) Bush, you know, you kind of covered a lot of H.W. (42:48) Bush and there wasn’t much more from his section to my section to Bill Clinton. (42:53) So I’m going to kind of skip over some of that because. (42:58) And I’m going to start real, real quick.(43:00) One important point on the Bosnia war is that we sent (43:03) who to 18 fighters in there with. (43:07) Yes. And the CIA.(43:09) Well, actually, it was before this, I guess it was the what did they call it? (43:14) I can’t remember the name of what the group was back then. (43:17) It was because this was pre CIA, I think, was the Afghan. (43:20) It was actually the Afghan Arabs, really, that came from the Afghan war (43:24) in Russia that we flew up.(43:25) But but yeah, it’s like we all get to it. (43:29) I know. Yeah, you’ll get to it.You’ll get to it all. (43:31) We’re good. Go ahead, Sean.(43:32) You know, but I’m going to start my section with some reading (43:35) just to give you a little bit of edumacation. (43:38) I’m going to start with this. (43:40) The PFP, the Partnership for Peace.(43:43) This is important. (43:45) The Partnership for Peace is a North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO (43:50) program aimed at creating trust and cooperation between member states of NATO (43:55) and other states, mostly in Europe, including post-Soviet states. (43:59) 18 are members.(44:00) The program contains six areas of cooperation, (44:05) which aims to build relationships with partners through military (44:08) to military cooperation on training exercises, disaster planning and response. (44:16) Science and environmental issues, professionalization, (44:19) policy planning relations with civilian government (44:23) during policy negotiations in the 1990s. (44:26) A primary controversy regarding the PFP was its ability to be interpreted (44:32) as a program that is a stepping stone into joining NATO (44:36) with full Article five guarantees.(44:39) Now, let me break this down for you and make it very easy for you in layman’s terms. (44:45) That is purgatory to get into NATO. (44:50) It’s that’s the best way I can explain it.(44:52) It is a place where you can your country can get into this, this, you know, PFP. (44:58) And if if you’re a good little boy and you do what you’re told, (45:02) then you can probably join NATO just maybe. (45:06) But there’s no guarantees either.(45:09) You know, it’s you know, and the best way I can explain it is a purgatory. (45:15) You know, what do you think, Jacob? (45:20) That’s a good that’s a good analogy, actually. (45:23) You’re just kind of like.(45:25) It’s like, yeah, because I mean, even going back to my section, (45:28) I think Baker said something similar about CISCA, (45:31) that like CISCA and the Partnership for Peace were just going to be like, (45:35) yeah, like the sort of like we’re getting you ready for NATO membership. (45:40) But but the focus was always NATO was never all these other things. (45:44) Like they were actually never going to build these things up as sort of like (45:47) the permanent part of European architecture or building peace with with Russia.(45:53) And Russia tried to adapt to that many times, including several times. (45:57) Gorbachev and others saying, fine, how about we join NATO? Right. (46:01) But but that was never on the table.(46:04) And really, in theory, like the whole time was like I keep (46:09) and I’m going to keep saying this as well. (46:10) You’re going to you’re never going to stop hearing me say it. (46:13) It was always about moving the goalpost always.(46:17) It was about global dominance rather than protection of European countries. (46:22) And that’s all it was. (46:24) It’s just really what it was.(46:26) And now I’m going to do a little bit more reading, (46:28) but I’m going to do it from the book, actually. (46:30) And I need you guys to really pay attention to this and let it stick (46:33) into your brain, especially for the whole rest of this eight or nine weeks (46:37) that we’re doing this. (46:39) And this is a part of the book (46:41) in the H.W. section called A Problem Called Ukraine, Communist Legacy.(46:47) Future tensions in Ukraine were presaged by a short verbal conflict (46:51) between Kiev and Moscow after they declared full independence (46:55) from the USSR, as Professor (47:01) Vladislav Zubuk (47:04) recounted, despite the fact that it was Russian President Boris Yeltsin (47:09) who engineered the final breakup of the USSR at the meeting in (47:15) Belovzich, Belarus. (47:18) He had thought Russia and Ukraine would sign some kind of new (47:22) confederation deal spurned by Ukrainian President (47:28) Leonid Kravchuk, we’ll call him. (47:31) Yeltsin and his spokesman announced that if Ukraine wanted true independence, (47:36) then Russian Federation would have to assert its own territorial claims (47:41) to the country’s far eastern Donbas region and Crimean Peninsula.(47:47) After a Ukrainian journalist called this a continuation of communist (47:51) imperialism, the press secretary declared, (47:54) you do not want to live with Russia in a union, question mark. (47:59) This is a communist legacy for you, question mark. (48:03) Then go, but return Crimea and Donbas to us (48:07) because they became a part of Ukraine because of the communist legacy.(48:11) For the next few weeks, it looked like there might be a war. (48:14) Finally, it was decided that the Russia’s new political (48:18) and economic relationship with the West was more important (48:21) and that the conflict would put the new working relationship in jeopardy. (48:27) Yeltsin believed Russia would have enough influence in Ukraine (48:29) that it would not be a problem.(48:32) So they put it off. (48:33) OK, and then it never came up again. (48:36) It never came up again.(48:39) Right. Exactly. (48:40) This book is only 100 pages long.(48:42) Right. What happened to They Live Happily Ever After? (48:46) And this is the craziest part. (48:48) Now, I really want you guys to like stick that in your mind (48:51) because that really sticks out to me.(48:53) That part of the book in general is like, whoa, OK? (48:58) Now in comes Bill Clinton. (49:00) Bill Clinton could have been like the guy who really made the deal (49:05) and like made it work and and stuff like that. (49:07) But instead, he kind of dismissed all of it and played the game.(49:11) And, you know, dangled the carrot in front of Russia saying, hey, you know, (49:16) we can you can you can be a part of this. (49:19) But first, you have to be a part of this. (49:22) Which which was the PFP that I spoke of? (49:26) Craziness.(49:28) But I think what I love about it, what I love about it is a PFP. (49:31) This is the beauty of the PFP. (49:33) It keeps you at arm’s length.(49:36) Yeah, you’re kind of NATO, but you don’t get a vote. (49:38) You don’t get a veto. (49:39) That really is what they didn’t want Russia to have.(49:42) It’s because Russia would have probably vetoed 90 percent of those things. (49:45) Right. It’s like when you’re it’s like when you ask the girl out of school, (49:50) would be like, hey, you got a date? (49:51) She’d be like, yeah, like I’ll go out with you.(49:54) But I’m busy this Friday and I’ll call you back. (49:58) Right. Like, you know, it doesn’t give you your number.(50:00) And you’re sitting there just like, oh, yeah, yeah. (50:02) She’s totally into me. (50:06) They fall in love with a stripper.(50:08) You know what I’m saying? (50:08) What do you know? Surprise, surprise. (50:11) Now to go back to America’s the stripper in this analogy. (50:16) America is the stripper.(50:17) I’ll tell you what. Don’t get me going. (50:19) But to go back to what Mark was saying earlier about Boris Yeltsin (50:22) being kind of a drunk, Yeltsin went to Poland and got wasted (50:27) with Lech Walesa, who happened to be the president at the time of Poland.(50:32) They got hammered together and the president of Poland kind of said, (50:36) hey, you know, Poland joining NATO is a great idea and stuff like that. (50:41) You know, and he kind of got him to believe it. (50:43) And so, you know, he goes home and then he sobers up and he’s like, (50:47) what the hell did I do? (50:48) You know what’s going on? (50:50) And Boris told the State Department about the promises made by H.W. Bush, (50:56) which they replied with that was never a part of the 1990 treaty.(51:02) That’s that was their answer to him. (51:04) So so because it wasn’t in writing, like I kind of brought up earlier, (51:08) we got to bring up the in writing thing a bunch. (51:11) It doesn’t count, right? (51:13) This is this is what the State Department is telling Boris Yeltsin.(51:17) Now, let me get the fact that Gorbachev would have never signed it (51:21) if it weren’t for the I think I counted at least seven promises (51:24) at the beginning that never, never. (51:27) So then we go into the fooling Yeltsin point. (51:29) And I’m going to read to you guys again, and I don’t have my glasses.(51:32) So please forgive me if I screw this up. (51:36) But fooling Yeltsin at the end of September 1993, (51:39) after receiving advanced praise from the administration, (51:43) Yeltsin attempted to dissolve the Congress of People’s Deputies (51:47) and Parliament when they refused and instead impeached and replaced him. (51:52) His forces violently attacked the Russian White House, (51:55) their parliament building, killing 144 people.(51:59) He then abolished the body and forced through a new constitution, (52:04) which centralized more power in his presidency. (52:07) Clinton made it clear, and as Clinton made it clear, (52:11) his administration endorsed Yeltsin’s attack, (52:14) telling him history is on your side. (52:17) In a speech at the Russian Academy for the National Economy, (52:21) Secretary Christopher declared that Russia is being reborn as a democracy (52:25) and called the democratically elected parliament (52:28) the last gasp of the old order in Russia.(52:32) Christopher explained that the United States does not easily support (52:35) the suspension of parliaments. (52:37) But these are extraordinary times. (52:39) The steps taken by President Yeltsin were in response (52:42) to exceptional circumstances.(52:48) Just insert Palpatine with that quote. (52:53) I love democracy. (52:55) You know, so nothing to see here.(52:57) Everything’s fine, right? (52:58) I mean, fine. (52:59) Hey, you know, it’s like Americans want to destabilize everything. (53:03) It’s like, let it all burn.(53:05) As long as we’re not burning, as long as everybody else is burning, we’re good. (53:09) So then Russia joins the PFP because they think it’s going to be this wonderful thing (53:13) and it’s going to be their gateway to NATO. (53:15) And what the hell does Bill Clinton do from there on out? (53:19) He gets up in front of a bunch of people and says, hey, we will be expanding NATO.(53:25) Wow. (53:26) Isn’t that something? (53:30) Wow. (53:32) But hey, everything’s fine, right? (53:34) I mean, the Russians, you know, they’ve only been trying to play ball this whole (53:37) time and continuously get bent over.(53:40) They don’t even spit on it before the United States and or NATO do what’s going (53:44) to do what they’re going to do to them. (53:46) But hey, you know, whatever, you know, whatever, I guess. (53:51) So then a Pentagon for peace.(53:53) Let’s go to that section. (53:54) Wesley Clark, Joint Staff General, really wanted to get Russia into the PFP and get (54:00) that lifted off. But guess what happened? (54:04) The hawk said, absolutely not, we’re not doing it, we’re not playing it, it’s not (54:10) happening.That’s what it is. (54:12) And that’s that. Wow.(54:13) I’m sure everything’s fine. (54:15) Everything’s still great here, right? (54:16) This is hunky dory. (54:18) We are in a great situation with Russia.(54:21) And then Wesley Clark started making up his talking points about how the weapons are (54:26) actually helping Americans and paying for us and making us prosperous. (54:30) That’s when he started. Wow.(54:32) Wow. Which is crazy. (54:34) You know, you know, surprise, surprise that, you know, people, you know, in the (54:37) military industrial complex and defense contractors are saying, hey, these are good (54:42) things because it’s making America more prosperous and our economy do well.(54:46) I don’t think the economy was that great during that time. (54:49) But hey, who am I? (54:50) I’m just some podcaster out here, you know, reading you guys some facts. (54:57) Now, Clinton, who tried to pretend.(55:01) That he was going to, you know, continue this. (55:07) Lie that we were going to not expand NATO, saying, hey, man, you know, we’re just (55:13) going to we’re just going to be the do the right thing and do the Russians well. (55:18) But guess who got in his ear? (55:20) Henry Kissinger.(55:22) Surprise, surprise. (55:24) Henry Kissinger, one of the biggest hawks in our time, says, hey, man, stop playing (55:28) games, be honest and tell them we are expanding NATO. (55:33) Be honest.(55:34) This is what Henry Kissinger is doing. (55:37) This is insane. (55:38) And meanwhile, in 1998, there is a huge Senate debate, right? (55:42) A huge Senate debate by Daniel.(55:48) Oh, my God, I’m going to say his name. (55:49) I’m going to sabotage his name. (55:52) Moynihan, we’re going to call him Daniel Moynihan, stating that if we continue to (55:57) poke the bear with Russia and try to expand NATO, especially if they let Poland, (56:03) Hungary and the Czech Republic in there, this is going to be a disaster.(56:08) You’re going to enrage them and we are going to have a big problem. (56:12) Now, this is the funny part. (56:13) This is where it gets real juicy, OK? (56:17) The rebuttal is.(56:20) Oh, wait, let me. (56:22) Oh, my God, I have chicken scratch here and it’s hard to read. (56:24) Oh, guess who is not having it, though? (56:27) Accusing Moynihan of being a Stalin supporter.(56:30) Guess who? Just take a wild guess who? (56:34) Joe Biden. (56:36) Joe Biden, who absolutely loves NATO, they even kind of break it down in the book (56:42) for you. Joe Biden said, absolutely not.(56:45) You’re a Stalin sympathizer. (56:46) You’re a Stalin supporter. (56:48) And if you’re going to go about this way, you know, you’re a real bad guy.(56:51) This was a debate that happened on the Senate floor. (56:55) Now, let me read this to you and then I’m going to pass it along in a minute. (56:59) But let me get the right page going.(57:03) Dividing lines. (57:04) Page 51 of the book. (57:06) President Clinton had said they would build and secure a new Europe, peaceful, (57:10) democratic and undivided at last.(57:13) But he wasn’t uniting Europe. (57:14) He was redividing it. (57:17) Ambassador Matlock and oh, Ambassador Matlock warned that if they were to exclude (57:23) Russia from the expanded alliance, it would be necessary, necessarily be against (57:29) them.The last Cold War had ended more than two years before the final fall of the (57:34) USSR. And and now the USA was already on path to restarting it again. (57:41) Former Secretary of State Kissinger, of course, is Kissinger.(57:46) A strong proponent of expansion admitted this was so in. (57:53) In the writing of Los Angeles Times that the new members are seeking to participate (57:58) NATO, not to erase dividing lines, but to position themselves inside guaranteed (58:05) territory by shifting existing NATO boundaries 300 miles to the east. (58:11) What have they been telling people this entire time? (58:14) What they were not going to do? (58:17) Go to the east, but hey, 300 miles is no big deal.(58:20) Right. Anyways, I digress. (58:23) And now I got to find my spot in the book.(58:24) His Democratic counterpart. (58:26) Oh, my God. Brezhnevsky also acknowledged that the delusion of shared global status (58:33) with America made it difficult for the for the Moscow political elite to abandon the (58:38) idea of a privileged geopolitical position for Russia, not only in the area of the (58:44) former Soviet Union itself, but even in regard to the former central European (58:50) satellite.Eugene J. (58:53) Carroll, Jr., a retired Navy rear admiral and deputy director of Center for Defense (59:00) Information, criticized advocates of NATO expansion, including Kissinger in a 1997 (59:06) essay in the Los Angeles Times referring to Kissinger’s acknowledgement that they (59:10) were just moving the dividing line further east. (59:14) Carroll wrote that this admission also provided a clear picture of Moscow’s perception (59:20) of a new NATO threat move closer to its borders. (59:24) This picture also reveals that at its heart, NATO expansion is aimed at Russia.(59:30) He referred to new Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s testimony to the Senate on (59:35) the off chance that, in fact, Russia doesn’t work out the way that we are hoping it (59:41) will. NATO is there. (59:44) Adding it may be safe to treat Russia as a prospective enemy today when it when it is (59:51) helpless to prevent NATO expansion.(59:54) But there is no long there is the longer term danger. (59:58) A hardline anti-war, anti-Western coalition will strengthen in Moscow and give priority (1:00:05) to anti-NATO measures in the future. (1:00:08) Guess what happened in 1999, ladies and gentlemen? (1:00:12) Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic had entered NATO after the promises and (1:00:20) handshakes were made for decades at this point that this would not happen.(1:00:26) And now I’m going to pass it on to Mark, that’s what I got. (1:00:30) Oh, boy. All right, sir.(1:00:33) Well, thank you for sharing that. (1:00:36) Welcome, everybody. (1:00:37) I have a fun time.(1:00:39) Buckle up because it’s a it’s going to be a fun ride to Sean’s point. (1:00:44) The part about, oh, Ukraine doesn’t want to play with Russia anymore. (1:00:48) Well, then give us back what’s Russia’s because we got you got that under Russia’s (1:00:53) watch, like that’s literally the land over which they’re fighting.(1:00:57) Right. So, you know, who are we to know? (1:01:01) All right, guys. So let’s start with the part of Madeleine Albright, Miss Broach (1:01:05) herself.She did an informal poll at the Council of Foreign Relations and by a two (1:01:13) to one margin, they opposed NATO expansion. (1:01:17) But how did the Hawks win with such strong opposition? (1:01:21) Does everyone remember the Eisenhower speech about the military industrial (1:01:25) complex? Well, he warned us about it. (1:01:29) And there’s this guy who shows up, Bruce Jackson.(1:01:31) And it’s the funniest quote from that Scott pulled up, but at night, Bruce Jackson is (1:01:38) the president of the Committee to Expand NATO. (1:01:41) By day, he’s the director of strategic planning for Lockheed Martin. (1:01:48) Uh, what? (1:01:50) Hello, NATO sells weapons.(1:01:53) And this guy’s ahead of the expansion of NATO and the guy who sells the weapons. (1:01:59) I have no conflict of interest. (1:02:01) Anyone? Everything’s fine.(1:02:03) Anyone want to jump in on that? (1:02:07) I don’t know how we didn’t see any of this coming. (1:02:10) I mean, Russia never once gave us any kind of warning. (1:02:15) And I mean, as Madeline, I’m trying to find the page you’re going to bookmarked where, you (1:02:19) know, Madeline Albright said that, like, we’re we’re America.(1:02:22) We stand tall. (1:02:24) We see further into the future. (1:02:27) Right.Like, yes, yeah, well, we’re the benign hegemony, right? (1:02:33) I mean, we haven’t gotten to the benign hegemony yet, but we have to use force. (1:02:37) Right. We have to.(1:02:39) The price is worth it, as you later said. (1:02:42) Right. But it’s good for us, you know, as they all are.(1:02:46) Any thoughts, Sean? (1:02:48) Or go ahead, Jacob. (1:02:49) Well, I was going to say, like, it’s just the hypocrisy of like, we have to expand NATO (1:02:55) because we need American influence over Europe. (1:03:00) And then like, well, like, oh, Russia doesn’t have any fear.(1:03:04) Why would they be upset with that? (1:03:05) It’s like, well, hold on. So like you’re saying if we weren’t part of Europe, we weren’t a (1:03:09) controlling force. (1:03:11) And Russia started doing the same thing, like you would just be like, well, whatever, it (1:03:17) doesn’t matter that Russia is expanding their military alliance all the way across Europe.(1:03:22) Right. What if they went overseas? (1:03:24) And like, what if Russia was expanding a military alliance? (1:03:27) Central America up into Mexico would just be like, oh, that’s cool. (1:03:33) We don’t care.(1:03:35) Right. (1:03:37) Any thoughts, Sean? (1:03:38) I mean, it’s always it’s always the United States government that’s double dipping. (1:03:45) It’s always somebody who’s in power who is double dipping.(1:03:48) So the fact that Lockheed Martin had this lockdown in the first place is not a (1:03:53) surprise. There’s nothing new under the sun. (1:03:56) OK.And so, you know, after Russia played ball and said, hey, we’re going to do this, (1:04:03) we’re going to do this, you know, all they really wanted, Russia wanted to join the (1:04:06) NATO NATO alliance. (1:04:08) All they wanted to do was skip the line because they have six thousand nukes. (1:04:12) OK, that’s that’s literally all it was.(1:04:15) The fact that they got treated like they were the communist regime of the past when they (1:04:21) had to at this point, they had two reformist presidents running the show that were (1:04:27) willing to, like, get involved and be a part of this alliance for them to get shot down (1:04:32) like that. Man, I would be mad, too. (1:04:35) I would be furious.(1:04:36) I would be furious because I shot my shot and you guys played me like a fiddle. (1:04:43) Yeah, yeah. (1:04:44) So all right, so continuing that, what’s interesting about this guy, the guy who (1:04:49) happens to run Lockheed Martin, who sells the most weapons, he runs this expansion for (1:04:54) NATO, and he also heads the Committee for the Liberation of Iraq that pushed for Iraq (1:05:00) War two in 2003.(1:05:01) What a coincidence. (1:05:03) So ninety four Clinton’s Clinton’s considering Poland for NATO induction prior to his (1:05:08) reelection campaign. (1:05:09) I’m sorry, it’s ninety six is what it is.(1:05:12) He was worried about Eastern European votes from Pennsylvania, Michigan, Illinois. (1:05:17) He ended up winning that election. (1:05:18) But he started talking about that NATO expansion that Sean mentioned happened in (1:05:23) nineteen ninety nine.(1:05:25) So here comes in hindsight, Gorbachev, Yeltsin, they felt deceived about NATO’s (1:05:30) expansion during the fall of the Berlin Wall. (1:05:32) We’ve all covered that pretty heavily there. (1:05:35) Former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov stated in 1996 that any attempt to bring Ukraine (1:05:42) into the NATO alliance would cross a Russian red line.(1:05:48) Now, everyone unprovoked, right? (1:05:51) We talk about provoked and I’d love to get you guys thoughts on it. (1:05:54) But provoke, provoke, provoke. (1:05:55) How many times has the has the corporate media, the mass media stated it is an (1:06:01) unprovoked attack by Russia? (1:06:03) Here’s in the book, any expansion during or any attempt to bring Ukraine is a Russian (1:06:09) red line.(1:06:10) This is back in ninety six. (1:06:12) Who was that again? (1:06:15) Primakov, Yeltsin, Primakov. (1:06:17) I didn’t know that he was a Russian agent.(1:06:20) I don’t think there was a lot of Russian. (1:06:21) Sounds like there was a lot of Russian agents in our in our, you know, government and (1:06:29) presidential cabinets and stuff in the 90s. (1:06:31) It’s a real problem.(1:06:32) I mean, that’s what this guy here, the beginning of the stream was implying that we (1:06:37) when I was talking about the LCI match, he said that the most the Kremlin can double. (1:06:41) Like, oh, please. (1:06:42) Like, yeah, it’s always Russian talking point.(1:06:45) Right. It’s always right. (1:06:46) It’s like it doesn’t matter that this is like, you know, all the different American (1:06:50) politicians, all the different American, you know, agents who were clearly America, you (1:06:57) know, like they they were these weren’t like anti-war intervention interventionists.(1:07:01) Right. Like they were pro what was going on. (1:07:03) But they were just kind of like, well, hold on, that’s not a good idea.(1:07:06) Like, you know, you’re you’re you’re coming on too quick. (1:07:09) Right. Yeah.(1:07:12) Sean, any thoughts? (1:07:15) I mean, hey, everything’s fine. (1:07:16) Act natural. I mean, you know, NATO in the United States have done nothing wrong.(1:07:21) They did everything on their part that, you know, they promised Russia and and that, you (1:07:26) know, they did their part and they’re you know, everything’s going to be fine. (1:07:29) Right. At least I’m trying to set mark up here, at least even though we were expanding (1:07:35) NATO, we were doing everything we could to not only support Russian democracy, but also (1:07:41) to really help their economy out.(1:07:42) Right, Mark. Oh, yeah. (1:07:45) Well, that gets even better.(1:07:46) So next part, this is where it gets good. (1:07:49) But this is where Clinton’s Bosnian war comes in. (1:07:52) So early into the presidency, we’ve got the Vance Owen deal.(1:07:56) Now, I’m not going to get too in depth about it. (1:07:59) But basically, Owen said the Bush senior won reelection. (1:08:03) This would have been settled in 1993 without troops even being involved.(1:08:07) That’s what that’s what Owen said. (1:08:09) But they didn’t. (1:08:11) The Serbs had two thirds of Bosnia at the time and Bosnian president.(1:08:15) This is the only guy. (1:08:17) There’s only two names I’m going to try. (1:08:18) And this is one of them.(1:08:20) It’s Izet Begovic, Izet Begovic was initially interested in a deal. (1:08:28) But someone got in his ear and said, no, no, no, we don’t want that. (1:08:32) So that deal gets killed.(1:08:34) And then Owen Stoltenberg gets replaced. (1:08:36) That gets replaced by this other deal. (1:08:37) But they didn’t sign it because they thought if he signed it, (1:08:41) if Izet Begovic signed it, who was on the on the back end of the deal, (1:08:46) he wanted the deal.(1:08:47) But if he signed it, he was afraid the Serbs would sign it. (1:08:51) And then he wouldn’t get U.S. (1:08:53) support like he was being encouraged. (1:08:55) So he was holding out for a better deal.(1:08:58) But it’s not like he was holding out for a better deal. (1:09:01) The United States was whispering in his ear going, (1:09:03) you need to hold out for a better deal because we got your back. (1:09:08) So he met with VP Al Gore and U.S. (1:09:10) was assured that he’d have the support of the new administration.(1:09:15) So the next piece plan, the contract group, the Bosnian Muslims. (1:09:20) That’s the side that we backed. (1:09:22) And this is where it gets fun.(1:09:24) They’re the ones who actually broke the ceasefire. (1:09:26) So NATO escalated by backing the Bosnian Muslims, (1:09:30) by attacking the Serbians with airstrikes across Bosnia. (1:09:35) Anyone want to chime in a little bit on that? (1:09:37) Meanwhile, NATO had no business being over there in the first place (1:09:40) because that broke the agreement.(1:09:43) I mean, hey, we keep going back to this. (1:09:45) You know, the agreement keeps getting broken over and over again (1:09:48) by the same perpetrator, which is the United States and or NATO. (1:09:52) Well, we can say the United States, because who runs NATO? (1:09:55) The U.S. does.Who funds 85 plus percent of it? (1:09:59) The U.S. does. So, yes, the West is doing this. (1:10:04) Jacob, any thoughts? (1:10:09) It’s just so funny how like I know history repeats itself, (1:10:14) but like usually when you think about that, you’re like, oh, every hundred years, (1:10:18) not like every decade, right? (1:10:22) You think it’d be a longer cycle? (1:10:25) Right.Yeah. Which which I mean, I think the sad part about this (1:10:29) and the commentary is like this. (1:10:31) This is not history that’s such far, like so far off from us.(1:10:35) But I think like one of the disadvantages of the like what’s going on, right. (1:10:41) The time period we’re talking about is that like the Internet (1:10:43) and social media aren’t really a thing. (1:10:45) So like people are only maybe finding out about this stuff like (1:10:49) I mean, I don’t know, maybe generously, maybe you’re able to (1:10:54) as an anti interventionist person, skeptical of the government, (1:10:57) maybe kind of like get a handle on things like weeks, months, (1:11:01) you know, maybe even a year later, like you’re not getting the kind of reporting (1:11:05) you need to the kind of comment on this stuff in real time (1:11:10) and push back on government propaganda on real time.(1:11:14) And then once this stuff becomes cemented in people’s heads, (1:11:18) I’ll just like the official narrative of all of this. (1:11:21) It’s really hard to go back and shake them out of it. (1:11:26) Yeah, for sure.(1:11:27) So this is where we get into the. (1:11:32) And the I guess the invitation by Clinton (1:11:35) to bring all the jihadists up from Afghanistan, right? (1:11:39) So basically, there was a point in here where he basically Clinton says (1:11:43) we owed them one and he made his actions to show that Muslim world (1:11:47) that we care. (1:11:49) So what do we do? (1:11:49) As early as 1992, Osama bin Laden’s men from Afghanistan, (1:11:54) Soviet war in the 80s traveled to Bosnia to fight (1:11:58) an estimated 5000 of them joined the Bosnian military (1:12:01) to fight the second wave of their jihad.(1:12:04) There’s a gentleman journalist named Brendan O’Neill said (1:12:08) the Western intervention in Bosnia had then globalized (1:12:12) the bin Laden terrorist movement. (1:12:15) Now, so this is between 92 and 96. (1:12:17) So when was when was 9-11? (1:12:19) Oh, yeah, that was like five years after.(1:12:21) So we America took bin Laden’s men and elevated them to the world (1:12:27) and actually spread them out by flying them up to Bosnia (1:12:29) and supporting them against the Serbs for some reason. (1:12:34) That’s how the Mujahideen came to be. (1:12:36) So this is the birthplace of Al-Qaeda.(1:12:38) So America, welcome. (1:12:40) You guys made Al-Qaeda. Congratulations.(1:12:42) So let’s let’s just do a little bit of this now, (1:12:45) because we might as well get into it now. (1:12:47) What’s going on in Syria, guys? (1:12:49) Did something happen like this week? (1:12:52) You guys recall? (1:12:54) Yeah, the CIA and the Mossad overthrew the Syrian government. (1:12:57) And now Assad’s hanging out with Putin in Russia right now, allegedly.(1:13:02) Yeah, it’s really weird. (1:13:03) It’s like the guy who had we have a 10 million dollar bounty on (1:13:07) is the guy that just took over for Syria. (1:13:11) And we didn’t we help with some like air support (1:13:14) and help bomb some places for them? (1:13:16) Are you saying that we funded both sides of wars? (1:13:19) Are you trying to say that right now? (1:13:21) I would not.(1:13:22) I would never say that we single handedly create all the terrorism that we fight. (1:13:27) I would never say that. (1:13:28) It’s the broken window fallacy, but on a global scale (1:13:32) and with millions of lives being, yes, the the currency, unfortunately.(1:13:40) Like we like we you we need the government to keep us safe. (1:13:44) Why? Because of all of these terrorists and all these violent regimes (1:13:48) that we’re funding. (1:13:49) Wait, I mean, that that that keep popping up out of nowhere, (1:13:53) for no reason whatsoever.(1:13:55) And I believe (1:13:58) how they get all these weapons. (1:13:59) Oh, never mind the never mind the U.S. insignias on those. (1:14:03) Just pretend those don’t exist.(1:14:04) Or the signatures by our by our congresspeople. (1:14:07) Oh, don’t tell me I live in Pennsylvania. (1:14:09) Don’t even don’t even bring that up to me.(1:14:13) Yeah, you must seen that firsthand. (1:14:16) So so what happens is public relations gets the left (1:14:19) and the right on board with this stuff. (1:14:21) Bosnian Muslim government.(1:14:23) They hired Ruder Finn Public Affairs to spin the war for them. (1:14:27) So they’re hiring public affairs companies to spin the war. (1:14:32) Everybody remember Wag the Dog? (1:14:33) Remember that movie? (1:14:34) Oh, yeah, I watched that recently.(1:14:36) It’s that one’s actually really good to watch recently (1:14:38) because it is all it’s very similar in how to how that is. (1:14:41) And you know what happened. (1:14:43) So we have another group enter in.(1:14:46) I’m sorry. (1:14:47) So the Bosnian Muslims, what they did, they hired this Ruder Finn group (1:14:50) and Ruder Finn. (1:14:51) They over exaggerated the death count and the prison conditions.(1:14:54) They called them death camps, but, you know, through propagandists (1:14:57) and stuff like that. (1:14:58) And what did that do? (1:14:59) That was to drum up more support on their side by the Americans. (1:15:04) Enter this guy named Tudjman, (1:15:06) and he was the leader of the Bosnian Croats.(1:15:09) And it, guys, you have to read it because the Bosnian Croats, (1:15:14) there’s Croatians, there’s Serbs, there’s Bosnian Serbs, (1:15:16) there’s Bosnian Muslims, there’s Bosnians. (1:15:19) It is that the words just all kind of get all mixed up. (1:15:22) So I’ll try to keep it as much as I can.(1:15:24) But basically, Tudjman was the was the Croats (1:15:29) and he fought alongside the Bosnian Muslims to start. (1:15:34) But then that was in early 1993. (1:15:37) But then he turned on them in a brutal siege on the town of Mostar (1:15:41) and he did some other atrocities.(1:15:43) So basically, he turned on the Muslims. (1:15:45) So this Croat guy, Tudjman, turns on Izetbegovic, his men. (1:15:52) And then Clinton promises to support Tudjan, (1:15:55) the same guy who just turned on him, (1:15:58) if he got the Croats and Muslims back together.(1:16:01) So he re-switched sides and joined them. (1:16:04) And these are the people that we find that are stable people (1:16:07) that we want to work with. (1:16:09) Any thoughts on that? (1:16:12) Stable? (1:16:15) What? (1:16:18) I mean, the United States is always mixing it up (1:16:21) one way or another in their foreign policy, (1:16:25) whether they’re, you know, it’s always about.(1:16:28) How they’re going to make the most money or which central banksters (1:16:32) are going to get the most money and how they’re going to get (1:16:34) the biggest return in the long run or who’s who’s which defense (1:16:39) contractor or which person in the military industrial complex (1:16:42) is going to get their money after lobbying our people for however many years. (1:16:47) You know, that’s what it boils down to. (1:16:49) Well, can I kind of say, like.(1:16:52) The difference between the American government (1:16:55) and the Russian government is that the American government is (1:16:59) admittedly better at selling a good story (1:17:04) about their corruption and their tyranny (1:17:08) and their imperial ambitions, because Putin’s not an angel. (1:17:12) It’s just that Putin is much closer to to to John McCain (1:17:16) than he is to Adolf Hitler is just the sad truth of it all. (1:17:22) And it may be even a little bit worse.(1:17:24) Like like that’s that’s even you could make a fair argument (1:17:26) that he’s John McCain, but worse. (1:17:28) But the point is, he’s closer to John McCain than he is to to to Adolf Hitler. (1:17:33) And the the corruption, you know, it’s like and we didn’t get here yet.(1:17:39) But like the everything that Clinton did and I guess Bush (1:17:43) and you’re playing a role in this, too, but everything that they did to Yeltsin (1:17:49) basically ensured Putin’s rise in the first place (1:17:53) is what I think is really interesting about this, (1:17:55) because they basically like all the interference (1:18:00) that they did politically, which we’ve talked about. (1:18:03) I don’t think we got to shock therapy yet, (1:18:06) you know, in terms of the economic stuff that went on. But (1:18:11) they destabilized the Yeltsin administration so much that like (1:18:16) they were so it was so unpopular and Putin became so popular (1:18:19) that it was just kind of like, you know, (1:18:24) I mean, you can kind of feel for Yeltsin in this story a little bit (1:18:27) when you read it, can’t you? (1:18:28) Kind of like that dude got screwed hard.(1:18:34) Yeah. I mean, I will say Yeltsin (1:18:36) seemed to not know what he was getting himself into. (1:18:40) I feel like he he wasn’t politically savvy enough.(1:18:44) And I think the United States really use that to their advantage. (1:18:47) You’re correct. I think I think that was a perfect analogy (1:18:50) because he really just wanted to do well.(1:18:53) He just wanted to bring his country into some sort of peace (1:18:57) and semblance, semblance and prosperity. (1:19:00) He wanted to bring some money. (1:19:01) Like you said, when he came here to the States, it brought tears (1:19:03) to his eyes to see the grocery stores.(1:19:05) He wanted that like he wanted that in his country. (1:19:09) And instead, you know, he did the best he could to try to play ball. (1:19:13) And he just got shit on time and time again (1:19:16) by, you know, the United States and or NATO both.(1:19:19) You know, it’s it’s so wild. (1:19:21) And people wonder why Russia is mad now. (1:19:24) We’ve barely gotten into this book.(1:19:25) And I bet you a lot of people are listening right now. (1:19:27) Their blood is boiling. (1:19:29) Well, the media has been the whole time that the big bad Russia (1:19:33) just came in and attacked Ukraine for no apparent reason (1:19:36) other than they wanted to.(1:19:38) I mean, you guys talked about how already under, you know, (1:19:42) Clinton, NATO expanded to to Hungary (1:19:46) and to Poland and Czechoslovakia, (1:19:50) like three countries that were explicitly named (1:19:54) by multiple Western leaders, including (1:19:57) the West German Chancellor Kohl (1:20:01) and then also Genscher from Germany (1:20:05) and then Warner from NATO, like like all these leaders saying (1:20:10) that like naming those countries by name, saying like, like, no, (1:20:14) we’re not going to go after them. (1:20:15) And then all the other ones saying we’re not going to go one inch (1:20:19) like it’s one thing to like have an agreement. (1:20:23) Right.And then like 10 years into it, be like, OK, maybe like facts (1:20:27) on the ground have changed and maybe we’re going to adapt the agreement (1:20:31) a little bit while we’re talking to you while we’re working with you. (1:20:34) But this was kind of like like it’s an abusive relationship, right? (1:20:38) It’s like pushing them, pushing your your partner down the steps (1:20:41) and then saying like, oh, you made me do it. (1:20:43) Oh, and now I’m going to invite this other girl into the house.(1:20:47) Yeah, that’s about right. (1:20:51) So so this is the thing. (1:20:53) Basically, what we want to do is there was an opportunity (1:20:56) to stop this thing at the beginning.(1:20:58) They remember Boris Johnson, same thing in Ukraine. (1:21:00) There was an opportunity to stop this thing in the beginning. (1:21:03) It probably would have been the best deal you could have had at the beginning.(1:21:07) Right. Seems much easier than the one that we’re going to get (1:21:10) after all these people die. (1:21:11) So I would just want to point out that our dragging of heel, this is (1:21:15) this is what I hate is war is not prosperous.(1:21:18) It creates death, destruction costs. (1:21:21) It’s poisons the earth with all the just the explosions (1:21:25) and all the gunpowder and minerals, you know, all the metals and stuff. (1:21:29) So Srebrenica comes on page seventy four.(1:21:34) The Serbs attack the town. (1:21:36) Muslims evacuate and they’re slaughtered as they retreat. (1:21:39) So basically, is a boat is a governor which pulls most of his Muslim troops (1:21:44) out ahead, leaving all the civilians behind, knowing that they’re going to get (1:21:47) slaughtered.So while the U.N. (1:21:49) goes to evacuate the women and children, the remaining men and boys (1:21:53) who still had guns on them, because to your point, your friend (1:21:56) who grew up in Yugoslavia was carrying an AK-47 when he was nine years old. (1:22:00) So they’re a combatant. (1:22:03) So they just slaughtered these children and they just mowed everybody down.(1:22:07) So then the U.S. (1:22:08) backed these operations, Flash Storm and Mistral, (1:22:11) carried out by Tuzman’s Croat forces against Bosnian and Croat, Croatian Serbs. (1:22:18) Then the Muslims, Bosnian Muslims do false flag operations (1:22:23) and they kill their own people at marketplaces and all these other places. (1:22:27) And then that is what’s crazy.(1:22:29) So we’re finding that the tactics used by the people who don’t have the means (1:22:34) Gaza, right, they do terrorist acts, they hurt their own people to get their means (1:22:39) because they have no other way of they don’t have teeth. (1:22:43) It’s not like they have a military. (1:22:44) They can actually do force.(1:22:46) So they create and hurt all their own people (1:22:49) to try to get a voice in some way on the national stage. (1:22:53) How does that seem practical in any way, gentlemen? (1:22:56) It’s not. It’s not at all.(1:23:00) It’s absolutely vile. (1:23:02) It’s disgusting. (1:23:03) And the fact that (1:23:05) the U.S. has such a play in something that has (1:23:10) their name isn’t even it has nothing to do with United States (1:23:13) sovereignty, liberty, anything like that.(1:23:16) It’s about building an empire in global dominance. (1:23:19) Like even in the early chapters where Jacob was, you know, (1:23:23) in his part of the book or whatever, like even even the neocon think (1:23:27) tanks like Bill Kristol, who really needs to be punched in the throat, by the way. (1:23:31) You know, sorry, not sorry, violence.(1:23:34) Well, no, Bill Kristol needs to be punched in the throat. (1:23:37) It’s defensive force at this point. (1:23:39) No.Yeah. But no, like people like him are literally out there saying, (1:23:43) you know, our leaders need to take this opportunity and make it theirs. (1:23:48) And it is what it is type situation.(1:23:51) People like him are saying that stuff. (1:23:53) Not to mention you have people like Margaret Thatcher. (1:23:56) You brought up Boris Johnson.(1:23:58) Yeah, Boris Johnson, the new leader of Britain. (1:24:03) Margaret Thatcher was a big part of this. (1:24:07) Which is she was also a big part of Iraq (1:24:10) in Kuwait in the early times during H.W. era.(1:24:14) You know, she told George Bush, don’t make us look bad (1:24:16) because Bush didn’t want anything to do with that in Iraq and Kuwait either, (1:24:20) because it was a turf war on land that wasn’t necessarily clean. (1:24:25) And Bush was like, man, we’re going to stay out of it. (1:24:27) Margaret Thatcher walks in.(1:24:28) No, don’t make us look bad. (1:24:30) Margaret Thatcher was not on board with the unification of Germany. (1:24:35) She was on Gorbachev’s side saying, hey, no, we don’t necessarily (1:24:39) want Germany to reunite here.(1:24:42) You know, so where’s Britain’s play in all this? (1:24:44) People leave Britain out of this all the time. (1:24:46) But they are just as evil as the United States when it comes to. (1:24:50) What do you think we learned it from? (1:24:52) Well, I mean, hey, learn our imperialistic ways from Britain.(1:24:55) I mean, they were the imperialists from whom we broke. (1:24:58) That’s right. (1:24:59) You know, you know, but you come full circle and here we are today.(1:25:03) You know, Boris Johnson is the one who could have ended this (1:25:05) and decided he wasn’t going to. (1:25:07) But we can’t spoil that because that’s going to come way later in the book. (1:25:10) I’m sure.(1:25:11) But, you know, we got to we got to like not leave Britain out of play. (1:25:16) And I’m tired of people not getting them into this mix (1:25:20) because they have everything to do with it. (1:25:24) All of it.(1:25:24) They have everything to do with what’s going on in Israel and Gaza. (1:25:27) They have everything to do with what’s happening in this book. (1:25:31) And nobody says a word about it.(1:25:33) No one. It’s wild. (1:25:36) It’s interesting, but they also are kind of on the decline there a little bit.(1:25:40) It’s kind of hard to put your finger at the biggest kid on the block. (1:25:44) So I want to work because we’re running out of time here. (1:25:47) But I want to kind of maybe end on this theme and kind of give you (1:25:51) you, Mark, and you, Sean, like the last words here, (1:25:54) kind of close out the section because you brought up how there was an opportunity (1:25:58) for peace.Right. (1:26:00) But but the I forget the name of the person, the Clinton administration (1:26:04) who told I can’t pronounce the dude’s name. (1:26:08) Yeah, it was Gore.It was actually Gore that told him. (1:26:10) He assured him that he had the new the new administration’s back. (1:26:14) Yeah.Yeah. And and we had a, you know, (1:26:19) that’s exactly what’s going on in Ukraine right now with Russia, (1:26:23) is that there were opportunities for peace and our government. (1:26:27) Biden told him, like, no, don’t don’t take the deal.(1:26:29) We got your back. (1:26:31) And then and if I may, on that point, very quickly. (1:26:34) Yeah.On that point, really quickly, Jake, I just want to finish this part (1:26:37) because it it leads right in. (1:26:38) So all these false flag attacks led to this thing called (1:26:42) was called Operation Deliberate Force. (1:26:46) So was U.S. (1:26:47) airstrikes from August 30th to September 14th? (1:26:51) It was like three weeks (1:26:53) against Serbs.(1:26:55) So they basically bombed the heck out of them and then invited them (1:26:57) to negotiating table. (1:27:00) So this is the funny thing, this guy, Derek Cholet. (1:27:04) So what they said, his quote is the United States had to restore (1:27:08) the credibility of NATO’s airpower.(1:27:13) And this is what we’re talking about right here. (1:27:15) So go ahead, please. (1:27:18) Now.Yeah, well, I mean, it’s just we (1:27:23) we could have. (1:27:24) I mean, they’re already talking about giving up land right now in Russia, (1:27:28) which was what was on the table (1:27:32) two to three years ago now. (1:27:34) Like so we instead, just like, you know, here in Bosnia and this war.(1:27:39) And I think it was like over 100000 Serbs killed at the end of this. (1:27:44) I don’t know how many Ukrainians have died. (1:27:46) A million about this war.(1:27:48) How many Russians have died? (1:27:50) It’s just like what? (1:27:51) Like, I’m not saying like, listen, (1:27:54) there is absolutely a right to self-determination. Right. (1:27:58) But the problem is the American government doesn’t actually care about that.(1:28:01) They care about American determination. (1:28:03) We were talking about this in our group chat earlier today, (1:28:06) just kind of reflecting on this privately. (1:28:07) And I was just like, you know what? (1:28:08) This is why I’m a libertarian.(1:28:11) This is why I’m an ANCAP, because the only way to truly have (1:28:14) self-determination is to to eliminate the state, (1:28:18) because it comes down to the individual. (1:28:21) It comes down to individuals in their communities deciding for themselves. (1:28:26) And when you don’t have that, you have states setting arbitrary (1:28:29) lines in the sand and deciding like, no, like you belong to this government (1:28:34) because we said so.(1:28:36) And it leads to violence every time. (1:28:39) And I don’t know. (1:28:41) I mean, I’ll repeat the great words of Harry Brown.(1:28:43) Like, when will we learn? (1:28:44) Apparently, apparently not yet. (1:28:48) But hence why we’re doing this. (1:28:49) I think we’re trying to learn from the history (1:28:52) so that we can debunk the propaganda and hopefully learn for the future.(1:28:56) Because if we understand that this isn’t just brand new, (1:28:58) I think there’s a lot of people waking up to the fact (1:29:00) that our government lies to us. (1:29:02) But it’s like, hey, it’s not like just it’s not just, (1:29:06) you know, what’s going on over the last five years or 10 years. (1:29:09) It’s the last 30, 40, 50, 60, keep going back.(1:29:13) They’re they’re they’re all liars. (1:29:15) They’re all warmongers. (1:29:16) They’re all blood soaked monsters.(1:29:19) And they don’t pursue peace. (1:29:21) And just to put my Christian spin on this quick, (1:29:24) you know, the the Bible says that they live at peace (1:29:27) as far as it depends on you. (1:29:29) It’s like, well, (1:29:31) that’s not something any of these elected officials, (1:29:33) many of which you claim to be Christian, are, you know, have ever done.(1:29:38) There’s not been a pursuit of peace as far as it depends on them. (1:29:41) There’s been a pursuit of power as far as it depends on them. (1:29:44) So do you guys got anything else that you wanted to to to comment on before? (1:29:50) We were we we started late and we’re still overtime a little bit here.(1:29:54) I don’t want to guys. (1:29:56) That’s my I’ll eat the shit on that one. (1:29:58) Oh, no worries.(1:29:59) Well, to close to close the Bosnian thing. (1:30:02) Right. We’re talking about this.(1:30:03) So we could have solved it at the beginning. (1:30:06) They pushed them to not after multiple years, (1:30:10) tens of thousands of lives, hundreds of thousands of people displaced. (1:30:14) They settle on a fifty one forty nine split, (1:30:16) which is where they basically started in the beginning.(1:30:20) Yep. So we end up where we start. (1:30:23) That’s what we’re going to see in Ukraine.(1:30:24) Almost other than more land lost, I think. (1:30:27) But hold on. (1:30:28) Remember, we went to Afghanistan and kicked out the Taliban (1:30:30) and then left in charge of the Taliban.(1:30:35) Let’s just have a pattern here. (1:30:37) I’m sensing a pattern here. (1:30:38) Let’s just put it this way.(1:30:40) Anybody who we are funding through proxy (1:30:44) within 10 years, we will be at war with them. (1:30:47) So come 2032, we will be bombing Ukraine. (1:30:51) We will be leveling Ukraine because we did it to Saddam.(1:30:54) We did it to Osama bin Laden and Gaddafi. (1:30:59) There’s nothing new under the sun. (1:31:01) There is nothing new under the sun.(1:31:04) There’s my I remember Manuel Noriega getting taken by Bush (1:31:07) back in the day. (1:31:08) I remember all these other things. (1:31:11) Funds for war through proxy and gives them weapons.(1:31:15) They will be leveling within 10 years. (1:31:17) History repeats itself. (1:31:19) And we all know that what we what we one thing we learn from history (1:31:23) is that we don’t learn from history.(1:31:27) Stop paying attention anymore. (1:31:29) Stop paying attention to the TV when it comes to foreign policy stuff. (1:31:33) They’re lying to you.(1:31:35) You know, get on a podcast, get on. (1:31:38) You know, I’m not saying, you know, of course, listen to our podcast. (1:31:41) But like I’m saying, get on a podcast for somebody (1:31:45) who is an independent thinker getting independent information.(1:31:49) They’re going to bring you the truth. (1:31:52) Honest and unmercifully, not these people are just saying that, (1:31:55) you know, the United States is just helping Ukraine because Russia’s bad. (1:32:00) The United States is helping Ukraine because we overthrew the government (1:32:03) in twenty fourteen.(1:32:04) The United States is helping Ukraine because they have foreign interests. (1:32:07) They made deals. (1:32:08) Hunter Biden made deals with them.(1:32:11) Joe Biden has deals with them. (1:32:13) They were opening (1:32:15) bio labs in there. (1:32:16) Why do you think Russia’s mad? (1:32:18) Ukraine was the hard stop.(1:32:20) That was the big no. (1:32:22) And here we are today. (1:32:24) It wasn’t, you know, it was, you know, they kept they kept saying, (1:32:27) you know, don’t come no more east.Don’t come no more east. (1:32:30) They kept coming. They kept coming.(1:32:31) They got closer. They got closer. (1:32:33) Then it got to Ukraine.(1:32:34) That was their hard stop. (1:32:36) What do you think the United States would do if? (1:32:39) Well, like I said, with the Kennedy thing, the Cuban missile crisis, (1:32:42) that was the hard stop. (1:32:46) I know.We agreed. (1:32:47) We have a Monroe Doctrine, so can they? (1:32:51) Boys, we’re we’re we’re out of time. (1:32:54) We will be doing at least seven more of these, probably eight more of these.(1:32:57) And we’ll probably do some bonus episodes throughout when we realize (1:33:01) we need more than an hour and 15 minutes to talk about some of these subjects. (1:33:04) But I promise that my camera on next time. (1:33:07) I’m sorry.(1:33:08) That means that means please don’t do that to us. (1:33:12) Everyone. Yes.Go listen to podcasts. (1:33:15) Also, go get yourself a copy of Provoked. (1:33:18) Yes.Washington started the new Cold War with Russia and the catastrophe in Ukraine. (1:33:22) Wherever you’re watching right now, make sure you are subscribed (1:33:25) not only to my channel, but go check out Bud’s in reality, which is Sean’s (1:33:29) and Knocked Conscious Podcast, which is Mark’s channel. (1:33:33) Check out the Libertarian Christian Institute.(1:33:34) Give this video a thumbs up wherever you’re watching it. (1:33:38) Share it around so more people can see and more people hear about the stuff (1:33:41) we’ve talked about tonight. (1:33:42) And with that, we’ll be back again next week at this time (1:33:47) with our first guest, Kyle Anzalone of the Libertarian Institute.(1:33:52) It’s going to be a great conversation. (1:33:54) We will talk to you guys then. (1:33:55) Take care.Take care. Peace.